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Family Law
BERTHA CLAIRE LEE* AND DEE L. ALTFATER**
The authors survey the recent Florida cases and legislation
in the field of domestic relations. Areas of emphasis include disso-
lution of marriage, alimony, custody and child support. After
discussing the recent developments, the authors analyze the stan-
dard of review applied by the various district courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Family law litigation and legislation has continued to increase.
Much of the litigation is centered on disputes arising out of the
parties' financial situation with questions of alimony, property
rights, child support and attorney's fees being the primary sources
of contention. The trend toward equal treatment of spouses can also
be seen in the opinions applying the criteria for exclusive possession
of the marital home to both spouses equally. The trend initiated by
the judiciary toward an equal sharing of community resources be-
tween the husband and wife at the time of the divorce has been
codified. Similarly, relative fault, as a factor in awarding alimony,
has also been codified. Furthermore, the special equities doctrine
developed in the real property decisions has been expressly ex-
tended to personal property.
II. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A. Jurisdiction
In Palmer v. Palmer, I the wife filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage and requested alimony, child support, attorney's fees and
costs. Her husband, an Army officer resident in Florida but sta-
tioned in Germany, was served by publication pursuant to section
49.021 of the Florida Statutes (1975). Reversing the lower court, the
District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the court could
assert only in rem jurisdiction over the defendant when service of
process was by publication. Consequently, the court dismissed the
wife's claims foi hild support, alimony, attorney's fees and costs on
the basis of lack of in personam jurisdiction over the husband. The
court pointed out that personal jurisdiction over the husband could
have been asserted under sections 48.193(e) and 48.194 of the Flor-
ida Statutes (1975) but that the wife had selected service by publi-
cation.
Also of note, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held
that an unappealed judgment of dissolution may not be subse-
quently challenged for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the
wife had not fulfilled the residency requirement.' Unless appealed,
1. 353 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
2. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 357 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
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a final judgment will preclude litigation of that issue, absent allega-
tions of fraud upon the court or lack of knowledge of the claimed
issue at the time of entry of the judgment.
B. Venue
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that venue,
in a suit to domesticate a foreign divorce decree, lies in the county
where the respondent resides rather than where child support and
alimony payments were to be made.' Following the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District,' the First District held that section
47.011 of the Florida Statutes controlled.'
C. Procedure
On a petition for rehearing, the District Court of Appeal, Sec-
ond District, held that a wife's answer to a petition for dissolution
which requested custody of the children, permanent alimony and
child support, constituted a counterclaim for purposes of preventing
a voluntary dismissal by the husband pursuant to Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.420(d)(1).1
One count of a postjudgmen t petition to set aside a final judg-
ment of divorce alleging fraud upon the court was held not to be an
independent action for relief from a final judgment.' Consequently,
the lower court's dismissal of the count was affirmed because the
petition was not filed within the one-year limitation period provided
in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). 8 In an alternative hold-
ing, the court stated that undue influence, duress and fraudulent
concealment of assets do not constitute a fraud upon the court.
Although it did not state what actions would constitute fraud upon
the court, the court cited Alexander v. First National'Bank, 10 which
listed certain acts, e.g., misrepresentations which would mislead the
court as to its jurisdiction over the defendant or tlfe"subject matter,
misrepresentations as to the identity of the defendant, or misrepre-
3. McIntire v. McIntire, 352 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
4. Ruscoe v. Ruscoe, 327 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
5. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (1975).
6. McFarley v. McFarley, 353 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
7. August v. August, 350 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
8. The limitation on an independent action would be four years from the discovery of
the fraud. See Tullo v. Homer, 296 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) ("In cases of fraud
. .. the statute ordinarily begins to run with the discovery of the fraud."); FLA. STAT. §
95.11(3)() (Supp. 1978)(legal or equitable actions founded on fraud).
9. 350 So. 2d at 794.
10. 275 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
sentations which prevented the parties from effectively litigating
the case.
With respect to an independent action for relief from a judg-
ment, the Second District has held that Rule 1.540(b) of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure requires a showing of fraud upon the court
for relief to be granted. In Erhardt v. Erhardt," the trial court had
relieved the husband of the obligations imposed by a two year old
decree, including $17,000 in arrearages, on the basis of Rule
1.540(b). The trial court had found that the wife had misrepresented
the husband's salary but that no fraud had occurred. Reversing, the
Second District stated that a finding of fraud upon the court was
required.
In Christiansen v. Christiansen,2 it was held error for the trial
court to deny without a hearing a wife's motion for temporary relief
pending the final hearing. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, noted that the relief sought was temporary alimony, attor-
ney's fees and suit money allegedly necessary to enable her "to carry
on the litigation and sustain herself until the final hearing.""a
A trial court was found to have abused its discretion by refusing
to allow the wife to testify regarding alimony because of her failure
to comply fully with Rule 1.611(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure," as well as by denying her requests for a continuance so
that she might comply." A partially completed statement had been
filed two months-before the final hearing and, upon disclosure of the
defects, the wife filed numerous motions for continuances which
were denied. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held
that where the failure to comply technically with the rule was nei-
ther willful nor" prejudicial to the husband, the refusal to allow
compliance was an abuse of discretion."
Although a statutory exception to the patient-psychiatrist priv-
ilege exists when the "patient introduces his mental condition as an
element of his claim or defense,"" the mere denial by the wife in
her answer to her husband's allegations as to her mental condition
11. 362 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
12. 354 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
13. Id. at 1255.
14. Hagin v. Hagin, 353 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 185 (Fla.
1978). Rule 1.611(a) requires the party seeking temporary alimony to file and serve on the
opposing party an affidavit specifying the party's financial circumstances. The opposing
party is then required to draw up an affidavit of his financial circumstances and serve it at
or before the hearing. •
15. 353 So. 2d at 952.
16. Id.
17. FLA. STAT. § 90.242(3)(b) (1977) (repealed 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237, § 2; effective
July 1, 1979, 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-379, § 1).
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does not constitute a waiver of the privilege." Moreover, despite the
denial of plaintiff's request to allow the psychiatrist's report into
evidence, the trial judge had obtained copies of the report over the
objections of plaintiff's counsel. Stating that it was aware of "no law
nor rule of evidence which permits a trial judge in a dissolution
proceeding, in the absence of agreement of the parties, to consider
matters not in evidence and not available to the attorneys,"" the
court remanded for a de novo hearing."
Haight v. Haight2 demonstrates the importance of submitting
sufficiently specific pleadings. The trial court, atthe final hearing,
found that the wife was entitled to lump sum and periodic alimony
although her answer and counterpetition did not contain a specific
prayer for such relief. The husband's counsel objected and the wife
moved to amend her pleadings to conform to the evidence pursuant
to Rule 1.190(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in allowing the amendment. Nevertheless, the
case was remanded to give the husband an opportunity to explore
the wife's financial resources because he might have been misled by
the procedural posture of the case.
D. Restrictions on Remarriage
A somewhat unusual divorce decree forbade the parties to re-
marry for four years. The District Court of Appeal, First District,
held that divorce from bed and board was abolished by section
61.031 of the Florida Statutes (1975) and that, consequently, the
court was without authority to restrict the parties' right of remar-
riage." The court modified the decree by deleting the provision.
I. ALIMONY
A. Reservation of Jurisdiction 7'
The reservation of jurisdiction by courts for the purpose of sub-
sequent modification of alimony awards has been raised by several
recent cases. The District Courts of Appeal for the Thirdn and
18. Mohammad v. Mohammad, 358 So. 2d 610, 612-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
19. Id. at 612.
20. Id. at 613-14.
21. 350 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
22. Hilderbran v. Hilderbran, 357 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
23. Lockwood v. Lockwood, 354 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Mumm v. Mumm, 353
So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See also Wood v. Wood, 359 So. 2d,23 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
(no abuse of discretion where jurisdiction was retained).
19791 1073
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Fourth Districts"4 have found error in the trial courts' failure to
retain jurisdiction subsequent to a decision denying or terminating
an award of alimony to the wife where there is a possibility of
changed circumstances in the future.
The consequences of failure to retain jurisdiction, at least in the
Fourth District, seem to turn on whether there was an award of
alimony in the original final judgment. In Boswell v. Boswell," an
order modifying alimony and adjudicating property rights was re-
versed because the trial court had failed to reserve jurisdiction.
There had been no alimony award in the original final judgment.
Conversely, in Kelly v. Kelly,2 the court held that the trial court
did have jurisdiction to modify a prior alimony award even though
jurisdiction had not been reserved. The court in Kelly premised its
decision on its reading of section 61.14(1) of the Florida Statutes
(1977).
It was held in Brisco v. Briscol7 that the court has no jurisdic-
tion to modify arrearages that had vested under a domesticated
foreign decree prior to the husband's petition for modification. Upon
granting the modification, however, the court has the discretion to
make the modification effective either as of the date of the petition
or after that date but prior to the date of the order.
B. Criteria for an Award of Alimony
The amendment of section 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes
(1977)2" codifies, with one significant addition, the criteria generally
applied by case law in determining a proper award of alimony.n The
requirement that the court consider, inter alia, "[t]he contribution
of each party to the marriage, including but not limited to services
rendered in homemaking, child care, education and career building
of the other party,"30 approaches a community property concept.
This new section, however, could be rendered nugatory by a judge's
reliance on section 61.08(1), which allows consideration of the adul-
tery by a spouse, and the last sentence of section 61.08(2) which
allows "[tihe court [to] consider any other factor necessary to do
24. Parry v. Parry, 353 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
25. 352 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
26. 361 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
27. 355 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
28. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-339, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (Supp. 1978)).
29. This addition appears to express legislative approval of the reasoning of Brown v.
Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
30. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2)(f) (Supp. 1978).
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equity and justice between the parties."3' Indeed, Linda v. Linda"2
expresses concern over the judicial undermining of the "no-fault"
concept in divorce but places the blame on the legislature because
of its inclusion of the above quoted sentence in section 61.08(2). In
Linda, the court held that the "question of whether or not the wife
actually committed adultery would be proper . . .where she is
claiming alimony,""3 but that the wife was not required to divulge
the name of her lover. The court then reiterated the view that any
evidence or impropriety should be limited to gross misconduct.
Relying heavily on two Fourth District cases,35 the District
Court of Appeal, First District, held that relative fault was a factor,
although not necessarily a determinative one, to be considered in
awarding alimony." By so holding, the court rejected the holdings
of the District Court of Appeal, Third Districti3 insofar as they
stand for the proposition that only the adultery of the spouse seek-
ing alimony should be considered. Thus, the First District has
adopted the broader view that the conduct of both parties relates
to and is indicative of the relative equities necessary to do justice.
The issue of relative fault was indirectly raised in McCloskey
v. McCloskey, 8 where the wife was denied the right to depose her
husband on the question of his extramarital affairs. The court re-
ferred to a previous case" in which it had held that evidence of
adultery is admissible when the amount of alimony is at issue.' 0 The
court noted, however, the husband's net worth of $18 million, stat-
ing: "[T]he husband is as rich as Croesus and a veritable harem
would have no effect on his ability to pay.""
Even before the amendment of section 61.08(2), courts were
moving toward a more equitable division of property. In Ruse v.
Ruse,'" a lump sum award of $4,000 to the wife was upheld, even
though the wife was earning $12,000 per year and the husband only
31. Id.
32. 352 So. 2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1978).
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied,
357 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1978)).
35. McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 357
So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1978); Oliver v. Oliver, 385 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
36. Williamson v. Williamson, 353 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
37. Claughton v. Claughton, 344 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Escobar v. Escobar, 300
So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
38. 359 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
39. Pro v. Pro, 300 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
40. 359 So. 2d at 496.
41. Id.
42. 351 So. 2d 81 (Fla. Ist DCA 1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1978).
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$5,000. The District Court of Appeal, First District, relied on Brown
v. Brown, 3 a case that endorses community property concepts while
declining to engraft "upon the jurisprudence of this state the law of
community property.""
In Jones v. Jones," the parties had been married for twenty-
three years and both had been continuously employed. The husband
was earning $1,650 per month while the wife earned $433. The trial
court's denial of alimony to the wife was reversed on the ground that
the husband earned four times as much as his wife. The requirement
of equalizing the parties' income in a dissolution decree is another
step toward a judicially sanctioned community property concept in
Florida.
In Lutgert v. Lutgert," the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, noted that although the recently enacted statute'7 was not
applicable to the case, its decision would be proper under that stat-
ute. In Lutgert, the parties had maintained an opulent lifestyle
during their ten-year marriage. Although the husband's financial
statements reflected his net worth as $3.9 million, the evidence
tended to support the conclusion that he was worth over $25 million.
In order for the fifty year old wife, who had not worked for thirty
years, to maintain a standard of living reasonably commensurate
with her previous one, the Second District found that the lower
court had abused its discretion in awarding her $4,000 per month
rehabilitative alimony for two years in addition to $75,000 lump sum
alimony in lieu of permanent alimony. The Second District awarded
the wife $6,500 per month permanent alimony, believing such action
to be necessary in order "to terminate this lengthy and costly litiga-
tion."' 8
Any award of alimony is improper without an evidentiary hear-
ing. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Darby v.
Darby," reversied an award of $21 per week alimony to the wife,
when no alimony had been mentioned at the hearing and where the
parties had stipulated that the home belonged to the wife and nei-
ther the husband nor the wife had appeared in court.
It was held to be error to place the burden on the wife to prove
complete and permanent dependence on her husband in order to
43. 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
44. Id. at 726.
45. 357 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
46. 362 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
47. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (Supp. 1978).
48. 362 So. 2d at 63.
49. 356 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
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entitle her to permanent alimony.50 The court stated that such a
showing by the wife "is a factor to be considered; but it is not an
essential element which must be proved [for] . . . an award of
permanent alimony."" The court held that after thirty-two years of
marriage, during which the wife devoted herself full-time to raising
four children, an award of permanent alimony was proper. In the
event of a petition for modification, it would be the husband's bur-
den to show significantly changed circumstances.
In the absence of an express agreement, the husband's estate
is not bound to continue alimony payments after his death. The
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Pan American Bank v.
O'Malley,5" held that a separation agreement providing: "Husband
agrees to pay unto Wife as and for permanent alimony the sum of
. . . ($850.00) per month. ' . until Wife becomes remarried or de-
ceased"" was not sufficiently specific to compel this result.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has twice held that
a husband could not be required to maintain a life insurance policy
on his life with the wife as beneficiary." On a proper showing, how-
ever, it may be that a court could impose such a requirement. In
Watterson v. Watterson,55 the court stated: "There is nothing in this
record which justifies an award of alimony after death."" Concur-
ring, Chief Judge McCord stated that when alimony after death is
not justified, it would be error to require the husband to maintain
a life insurance policy on his life for the benefit of his wife.57
In authorizing an award of permanent alimony, the likelihood
of the wife's rehabilitation is another factor which the courts will
consider. In a twenty-one-year marriage with three minor children,
the trial court awarded, in addition to child support, $600 per month
rehabilitative alimony to be reviewed in six years.58 The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed, and amended the final
judgment to provide for permanent alimony. The court analyzed the
following facts in arriving at its decision that "it was an abuse of
discretion to deny permanent alimony and make the alimony reha-
50. Garrison v. Garrison, 351 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
51. Id. at 1105.
52. 353 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); cf. Ford v. First Nat'l Bank, 260 So. 2d 876 (Fla.
2d DCA 1972) (absent agreement of parties, alimony may not be awarded beyond husband's
death), cert. discharged, 283 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973).
53. Id. at 857.
54. Patrick v. Patrick, 358 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Watterson v. Watterson, 353
So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
55. 353 So. 2d 1185, 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
56. Id. at 1189 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 1190 (McCord, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Gratton v. Gratton, 358 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
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bilitative in character:" 59 (1) the length of the marriage; (2) the
presence of minor children; (3) the wife's chronic physical ailments;
and (4) the wife's lack of adequate earning capacity to approximate
the living standard she enjoyed during the marriage.10 The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, under similar facts-a twenty-
five-year marriage and a high standard of living-held that the trial
court had abused its discretion in awarding $550 per month for three
years as rehabilitative alimony."
In the District Court of Appeal, First District, an award of
permanent alimony was also justified where the wife was being
treated for a heart condition and was advised to cease working."2 The
court noted, however, that the award was still subject to modifica-
tion in the event of significantly changed circumstances. The First
District, however, reversed the award of permanent alimony where
the parties had been married for five years, where there were no
children and where the wife was soon to be reemployed. 3 Thus, it
seems that the length of the marriage, the presence of minor chil-
dren, the parties' standard of living during the marriage, and the
wife's earning potential are the critical factors.
C. Rehabilitative Alimony
When the District Court of Appeal, First District, required the
payment of rehabilitative rather than permanent alimony to a
twenty-nine year old wife with two small children who had pre-
viously worked, the wife filed a petition for rehearing." In the ensu-
ing discussion, the court stated "that just as permanent does not
necessarily mean forever. . . neither does rehabilitative necessarily
mean temporary." 5 The court observed that if the trial judge were
to determine that the wife's responsibilities as a mother would pre-
vent her from rehabilitating herself, it was in his discretion to award
rehabilitative alimony for an extensive period of time."
In a much clearer case of abuse of discretion, however, the First
District reversed the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony at
the rate of $1,200 per month for a period of one year. 7 The facts
59. Id. at 265.
60. Id. at 264.
61. Douglas v. Douglas, 361 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
62. Catches v. Catches, 354 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per curian).
63. LaFountain v. LaFountain, 359 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
64. Manning v. Manning, 353 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (per curiam).
65. Id. at 105.
66. Id.
67. Smithwick v. Smithwick, 353 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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indicated that the wife had helped her husband through medical
school and had borne three children; the husband had earned
$236,890 in his first year of practice. Upon reversal, it was ordered
that the alimony should not be reduced until the youngest child
reached majority, plus a reasonable time thereafter for rehabilita-
tion.18
Where the parties have a more modest standard of living, a
court may use rehabilitative alimony to equalize the disparity in
their earnings. For example, in Zaugg v. Zaugg,6' the husband
earned $28,000 per year while the wife earned $8,000. The court
modified a lump sum award of $5,200 at $100 per week to rehabilita-
tive alimony at $100 per week for three years. Similarly, in Losco v.
Losco,70 the court increased the time period during which the $37.50
per week rehabilitative alimony would be received from one year to
two, where the husband and wife each had assets worth $20,000. The
court increased the rehabilitative alimony because the wife would
have to spend a substantial sum to train herself for the job market.
Nevertheless, a wife may be entitled to rehabilitative alimony
even if the husband does not have any funds. In such a situation and
where in addition there was a strong likelihood that the husband's
financial circumstances would improve, the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, remanded a case to the trial court with instruc-
tions to reserve jurisdiction for a reasonable time in order to be able
to modify the award if the husband's financial circumstances
changed.7
D. Lump Sum Alimony
The circumstances which will justify the award of lump sum
alimony have been the subject of some confusion in the past, as well
as the present. A recent, well-reasoned opinion, however, has deline-
ated the boundaries for such an award. In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 72
the court stated: "Lump sum alimony is justified only where it
serves a reasonable purpose, such as rehabilitation, or where the
marriage's duration or the parties' financial position would make
such an award advantageous to both."73
68. Id. at 573.
69. 357 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
70. 354 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
71. Lockwood v. Lockwood, 354 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
72. 356 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
73. Id. at 859. The dissent, however, felt that the majority was unnecessarily harsh in
denying the wife the marital home as lump sum alimony in view of the 33 year duration of
the marriage, the fact that the wife had quit college to help establish her husband's medical
career, and that the husband's net worth was over $3.5 million. Id. at 861.
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
An example of the continued confusion over tle concept of
lump sum alimony is the recent case of Seale v. Seale.74 In Seale,
the court, in a supplemental judgment, awarded what it labeled
"lump sum alimony" to a wife who had remarried after the conclu-
sion of the dissolution portion of her bifurcated trial, but before the
court had resolved the issues of alimony, property division and child
custody. An examination of the facts reveals that the former hus-
band had recently become totally disabled and had no source of
income. The trial court, having awarded the two minor children to
the wife, stated that "the needs of the wife to care for her children
are apparent and the only ability which the husband has to provide
for those needs is by conveying to the wife as lump sum alimony the
real estate owned by the husband in his sole name."75 Thus, it is
clear that this court had, in substance, provided child support in the
guise of lump sum alimony.
Similarly, in Claughton v. Claughton, 75 the wife had also remar-
ried subsequent to the dissolution of her marriage but prior to the
judicial determination of either alimony or child support. The hus-
band stopped paying temporary support upon his wife's remarriage,
and she sued for contempt. Claiming that he was under no obliga-
tion to pay alimony, the husband moved for summary judgment.
The trial court denied the motion, impliedly holding that an award
of alimony is proper after remarriage. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, was compelled to distinguish Seale. The court
pointed out that while the Seale decision apparently creates preced-
ent for the proposition that a wife's rights to lump sum alimony
payments vest immediately upon the dissolution of her marriage
and are unaffected by her subsequent remarriage, such a holding is
inconsistent with prior case law. The court then held that where a
wife remarries prior to any award of alimony, whether lump sum or
periodic; her rights to alimony have not vested and are barred by
her subsequent remarriage.77
An award of lump sum alimony more in keeping with the guide-
lines stated in Canakaris was made in Ferriss v. Ferriss.1S In that
case a wife who had worked throughout her thirty-year marriage was
awarded the husband's one-half interest in the marital home as
lump sum alimony." The court found that while the wife had
74. 350 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
75. Id. at 97.
76. 361 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
77. Id. at 756.
78. 356 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
79. Id. at 896. Conversely, where a husband was awarded possession of a house purchased
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worked during the marriage and had given her husband special care
during a long illness, the husband had made imprudent investments
with their joint funds which had left him financially unable to as-
sume periodic alimony payments sufficient to compensate fairly the
wife. Conversely, in Storer v. Storer, 8 where the husband was quite
wealthy and the wife had already received $2,261,000 in alimony
and $200,000 in attorney's fees, the court held that there was no
showing of the wife's special need for the marital home. Similarly,
in Bucci v. Bucci,11 the award of the marital home to the wife was
reversed. The reversal by the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, was due to the following factors: (1) the trial court had equally
divided approximately $235,000 of jointly held assets; (2) the cou-
ple's two children were grown and no longer in need of support; and
(3) the wife had received $750 per month as permanent periodic
alimony. In view of these findings, the court concluded that an
award of the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony served
no "reasonable purpose such as rehabilitation or the protection of
the children."8
Despite the caveat stated in Canakaris that "the requirement
that lump sum alimony be based upon special equities must not be
confused with an award in a dissolution of marriage action to a
spouse who has acquired a special equity in property accumulated
during the marriage,'' courts continue to fall into the trap created
by this identical language. In Meridith v. Meridith,'8 even though
the husband's entire net income was only $179.35 per week and his
only asset was a $15,500 undivided half interest in the marital home,
the court affirmed an award of forty percent of his income to his wife
for child support and deprived him of his only asset as lump sum
alimony. A strongly worded dissent accused the majority of confus-
ing "special equities" in property with "special equities" to be con-
sidered when awarding lump sum alimony. 5 In a similar vein, in
Birs v. Birs,8 the wife was awarded the husband's interest in the
marital home as lump sum alimony.The District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, found that the wife had made no showing of need
during the parties' brief marriage, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed an
award of $13,000 to the wife, which sum represented the amount she had contributed toward
the purchase of the house. Kast v. Kast, 351 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
80. 353 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
81. 350 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
82. Id. at 789.
83. 356 So. 2d at 859-60.
84. 352 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (per curiam).
85. Id. at 72, 73 (Downey, J., dissenting).
86. 354 So. 2d 428 (Fla.' 4th DCA 1978).
19791 1081
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
sufficient to support such an award and remanded the case so that
the trial court might specify whether or not it had meant to find that
the wife had some special equity in the home as a result of her
contribution to the husband of certain stocks.87
An illustration of the distinction between the two special equi-
ties may be found in Storer v. Storer."5 The court in Storer stated
that since the property in question had been previously owned by
the husband rather than acquired during the marriage, the only
special equities to be considered were whether the wife had made
such a showing of special need for the house that it would constitute
an appropriate award of lump sum alimony.
In a series of cases, the courts have held that it is error to award
lump sum alimony where it is not pled nor the need proven." In
cases where the need for an award of lump sum alimony is proven,
those awards may be modified by the court in fairness to the hus-
band. For example, in Spotts v. Spotts," where both husband and
wife contributed earnings to the marriage, a lump sum award of
$25,000 was reduced to $7,000 because the court recognized that the
husband had many debts to repay and the wife was able to work. A
similar adjustment in Keller v. Keller" allowed the money paid by
the husband as temporary alimony pending appeal to be credited
toward the award of lump sum alimony.
E. Enforcement of the Award
The incomplete wording of section 61.12 of the Florida Statutes
(1977) has been remedied by both the courts and the legislature. In
Clemons v. Morris,"2 it was made clear that even though section
61.12(1) refers only to orders of the court, it applies to judgments
for alimony or child support as well. Additionally, the legislature
recently amended section 61.12(2) to allow the enforcement of peri-
odic alimony payments in addition to enforcement of periodic child
support payments through the use of a continuing writ of garnish-
ment.93
87. Id. at 429.
88. 353 So. 2d 152, 158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977),
89. See Dobbins v. Dobbins, 359 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Foxx v. Foxx, 357 So.
d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 356 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Andrews
v. Andrews, 356 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The dissent in Dobbins, however, claimed
that FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1977) does not require that the wife categorize the type of alimony
sought. 359 So. 2d at 49 (Booth, J., dissenting).
90. 355 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
91. 356 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
92. 350 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
93. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 76-63, § 1 (codified at FA. STAT. § 61.12(2)(Supp. 1978).
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In a case involving garnishment under section 61.12 of the Flor-
ida Statutes (1975), the wife attempted to garnish her former hus-
band's wages to enforce alimony payments under two different judg-
ments." The first judgment was based on an excontractu action at
law to enforce a separation agreement which had not been incorpo-
rated into the couple's Pennsylvania divorce decree. Because this
was not a judgment based on an action to enforce a decree or order
of the court in a proceeding for dissolution, alimony or child sup-
port, the court held that the husband stands "as any other judgment
debtor; as the head of a household his wages cannot be garnished
by a judgment creditor.""5 The second judgment, however, was a
Florida decree adopting and enforcing the separation agreement for
support of the wife and children which the court found to be collecti-
ble by garnishment pursuant to section 61.12(2).
In a similar case involving the enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment, Kellenbenz v. Kellenbenz, 1 the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that a judgment domesticating a foreign decree
of divorce was a final judgment. Thus, the domesticated judgment
was enforceable notwithstanding the court's reservation of jurisdic-
tion to consider memoranda of law on whether it had power of
contempt over the husband's actions prior to the Florida domestica-
tion of the Canadian judgment.
In Kelly v. Kelly, 7 the husband ceased paying alimony when
his former wife remarried in Texas. When the wife's Texas marriage
was annulled, she petitioned to have the former husband held in
contempt for failure to pay alimony. The wife pled that under Texas
law an annulled marriage is void ab initio and that alimony pay-
ments should be reinstated. Under Florida law, the marriage would
have been rendered voidable and would not have required the re-
sumption of alimony payments. 8 The court held, however, that
since the former husband had failed to assign as error the wife's
inadequate pleading of the foreign law, he was bound by the court's
order requiring him to make future alimony payments.
A split of authority with respect to the specificity of a court's
decree for a judgment of arrearages has developed between the Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal, Second and Fourth Districts. The Fourth
District, in Mulligan v. Mulligan," held that there was no legal
94. Busot v. Busot, 354 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
95. Id. at 1257.
96. 360 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
97. 350 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
98. Id. at 12.
99. 351 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
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requirement that the trial court make specific findings regarding
what portions of an $85,000 judgment were due as past support,
alimony, educational expenses and medical expenses. On the other
hand, in Thomas v. Thomas,1o the Second District held that the
trial court had erred by failing to allocate the arrearages to the
above mentioned categories and remanded to the trial court for
corrections.
In the absence of evidence of a husband's intent to be uncooper-
ative or to conceal assets, it was error to provide in a final judgment
that the alimony obligation of the husband should be secured by a
lien against certain real property.' 1' The case was remanded so that
the trial court could reserve jurisdiction to make a lump sum award
in the event of the husband's death because the original alimony
had been designated as a charge against the husband's estate.
F. Modification
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has affirmed an
order terminating a husband's permanent alimony obligations be-
cause of his former "wife's improved financial circumstances .. .
irrespective of any change in husband's financial abilities.' 102 Unfor-
tunately, the opinion does not elaborate on what these improved
financial circumstances were. In Rothenberg v. Rothenberg, 3 how-
ever, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the
wife's improvement in her financial position (she was then earning
$9,000 per year) was insufficient to warrant modification of the de-
cree. In Rothenberg, the court rejected the husband's argument that
the trial court had committed error by its continuance of alimony
in the face of what the husband argued was a clear showing that the
wife was self-supporting. The court held that there was no error of
law because the master had found that she was not self-supporting.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, requires that a
substantial change in circumstances be unforeseeable to warrant
modification of alimony. In Ashburn v. Ashburn, ,04 it was held that
the wife's receipt of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home
did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances because
the sale had been ordered by the final judgment dissolving the mar-
riage. Similarly, in Coe v. Coe, 05 the wife's return to work when
100. 352 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
101. Davis v. Davis, 358 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
102. Moreland v. Moreland, 358 So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
103. 358 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
104. 350 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (per curiam).
105. 352 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (per curiam).
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their child began school was not a "substantial change in circum-
stances," since it was a "readily foreseeable eventuality.' '"0
After being divorced for fourteen years, the wife sought modifi-
cation of alimony from $600 per month to $2,000 per month. The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the trial court's
granting of the husband's motion to quash a notice to produce cer-
tain financial documents at his deposition, holding that since the
husband had responded to the wife's petition by admitting that he
was financially able to pay the increase, the only question properly
before the court was whether the wife was entitled to the increase. 0
Whether an award of certain property incident to a divorce
proceeding may be subsequently modified turns on whether the
award was in the nature of alimony or a true property settlement
agreement. In Hyotlaine v. Hyotlaine, 0 8 the wife contended that the
entire agreement between her and her husband was a property set-
tlement agreement and thus not subject to modification. The hold-
ing that the periodic payments were indeed alimony was based, in
part, on the provision in the agreement that "all payments provided
by this paragraph shall be taxable to the wife and deductible by the
husband."'1' The court pointed out that such tax treatment would
be available only if the payments were alimony."10 The court, how-
ever, also found that the husband's agreement to hold $200,000
worth of collateral in escrow was an integral part of the contract
between the parties and not modifiable under section 61.14 of the
Florida Statutes (1975).
Moreover, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, re-
quires that an award of money, to be considered a property settle-
ment rather than alimony, must appear to be so from the record.
In Goerlich v. Goerlich, "' the court reversed the trial court which
had found that an oral agreement, read into the record and included
in the final judgment, was a property settlement and not subject to
modification. "'
The husband must specifically petition for cancellation of ali-
mony rather than simply seek a reduction to zero because cancella-
106. Id. at 560.
107. Alterman v. Alterman, 361 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
108. 356 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
109. Id. at 1321.
110. Id.; see I.R.C. §§ 71, 215.
111. 358 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
112. Alimony was to be paid at $500 per month for two years, $400 per month for three
years, and $200 per month for four years. These amounts were clearly set aside "as and for
alimony" and no mention of the agreed monetary property settlement was made. Id. at 896.
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tion divests the court of jurisdiction while a reduction does not."3
The First District has held that a successor judge (to the de-
creased trial judge) may not, upon the same facts, review, modify
or reverse the final orders of his predecessor, absent fraud or mis-
take."'
IV. PROPERTY
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The wife in Rothenheber v. Jessup"5 sought to enforce the pro-
visions of a property settlement agreement authorized by the court
in which her former husband had agreed to make house payments
until it was completely paid for.' The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that since the lower court had no authority to
modify the property settlement agreement, the husband was not
discharged from his obligation when the wife sold the house to a
third party. Similarly, where the wife made no claim of special
equity in the house owned as tenants by the entirety, the court had
no jurisdiction to enter an order divesting the husband of his one-
half interest.'" Absent a contrary showing, the husband and wife,
by statute, became tenants in common.""
B. Partition
It is well-settled that a court may not apportion either real or
personal property where there is no evidentiary support therefor.
Thus, in Beard v. Beard," it was error for the trial court to award
the wife all personalty in the home in the absence of an agreement
between the parties or an appropriate pleading for such relief.2 0
In Jacobs v. Jacobs,'2 husband and wife had partitioned jointly
owned timberland, the wife having chosen the piece of property she
preferred. The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed the
award to the wife of one-half of the $25,000 proceeds from the sale
113. Jennings v. Jennings, 353 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
114. McBride v. McBride, 352 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
115. 360 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
116. Id. at 800.
117. DiMartino v. DiMartino, 360 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
118. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1977).
119. 356 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
120. Where the pleadings comply with the requirements of FLA. STAT. § 64.041 (1977),
however, the court has no discretion; if the allegations are properly pled and proven, the court
must grant partition. In re Marriage of Jones, 357 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Zaugg v.
Zaugg, 357 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
121. 358 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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of timber harvested off the land, holding that she was entitled only
to that portion of the proceeds (here, one-tenth) attributable to
timber cut from her portion of the property.
C. Special Equities Doctrine
A "special equity" in real property is created by an unrebutted
showing that all of the consideration paid for property held as ten-
ants by the entirety was supplied by one spouse from a source
clearly unrelated to the marital relationship. The doctrine, enunci-
ated in Ball v. Ball, "I has been expressly extended to personal prop-
erty by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Merrill v.
Merrill. "I In Merrill, it was held that the wife's relinquishment of a
pension paid to her as the widow of her former husband was not the
kind of contribution intended by Ball to rebut the husband's show-
ing that his acquisition of the property came from funds totally
independent of the parties' seven-month marriage. Several District
Court of Appeal decisions, however, have recognized its application,
albeit without citing Ball as Authority for their holdings. Thus,
where the wife neither pled nor proved a special equity in a jointly
owned automobile, the Fourth District held that the car was owned
by the parties as tenants in common.'24 The First District reversed
the trial court's award to the husband of his wife's one-half interest
in their yacht on the ground that the husband had failed to plead
the existence of a special equity for himself in the yacht.2 5 In Dozier
v. Dozier, 26 the Third District, reversing the award of all personalty
to the wife, remanded the case for presentation of testimony regard-
ing the ownership of the parties' personal property, including the
presence of any special equity in the wife.
Several decisions have followed Ball in finding a special equity
in real property. The husband, upon showing that he had made the
downpayment on certain real property with funds he had inherited
separately from his mother and had continued to make all subse-
quent payments, was held to have established a special equity so
that the jointly owned property was awarded solely to him. 7 The
wife's brief testimony as to her understanding of the husband's do-
native intent was insufficient to rebut the husband's entitlement to
122. 335 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1976).
123. 357 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
124. Stetson v. Stetson, 356 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th. DCA 1978).
125. Garmon v. Garmon, 357 So. 2d 487 (Fla. lst DCA 1978).
126. 356 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
127. Bickerstaff v. Bickerstaff, 358 So. 2d 590 (Fla. lt DCA 1978).
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the property. Similarly, in Tyrrell v. Tyrrell,'2 the wife failed to
show a special equity in certain real and personal property merely
by virtue of having been a "mother and homemaker." The District
Court of Appeal, First District, however, has found that a wife had
a special equity in property held in the husband's name where the
property was acquired with funds from a joint bank account to
which both had contributed. "' Similarly, where a wife had fur-
nished all funds for two condominiums acquired as tenants by the
entirety during the parties' brief marriage, she was awarded a one-
hundred percent special equity in the property, "" The District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, on the other hand, reversed an award of
a special equity in the house to a wife where the only testimony
submitted was that the house was a gift from the wife's mother to
both her and her husband.'"' The court stated that even though
there was a default by the husband, "a plaintiff in a marriage disso-
lution case must prove the allegations of the complaint and the
entitlement to various property awards."'32 The Fourth District has
also reversed a trial court's award to the wife of the husband's inter-
est in the house where the parties earned approximately the same
salary and the wife had made no showing of a special equity.'33
D. Awarding Possession
In Florida, the award of exclusive possession of the marital
home must be based on either: (1) the presence of minor children;
(2) a special equity; (3) an award of lump sum alimony; or (4) other
special circumstances. After enumerating these factors in Kelly v.
Kelly,'3' the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a
trial judge is not required to modify an unappealed judgment simply
because none of these factors was present at the time the judgment
was granted or at the time modification was sought.'3 1 It is error,
however, for the trial judge to grant exclusive possession if all these
factors are absent, and, if appealed, such a ruling will be reversed.'36
Currently, these criteria are being applied equally to both spouses.
128. 359 So. 2d 62, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
129. Knoblock v. Knoblock, 351 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
130. Malkemes v. Malkemes, 357 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); cf Easterling v. Easter-
ling, 358 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (reversing award to wife of one-half interest in
mobile home purchased prior to marriage).
131. Manley v. Manley, 360 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
132. Id. at 490.
133. Chayka v. Chayka, 361 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
134. 361 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
135. Id. at 429.
136. Segal v. Segal, 353 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
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The District Court of Appeal, First District, has reversed a lower
court by holding that a husband, who had been granted custody'of
the parties' minor son, was entitled to the exclusive possession of the
house until the child's majority or the husband's remarriage. 3 7
E. Presumptions
It is well-settled that when property is acquired with the hus-
band's funds and title is taken in both names, a tenancy by the
entirety is created and the presumption arises that a gift to the wife
of an undivided half interest is intended.'38 The District Court of
Appeal, Second District, has held that a husband's testimony to the
effect that he paid for the property is insufficient to rebut this
presumption. 3 ' Apparently relying on this presumption, the wife in
Josephs v. Josephs"" argued that since most of the money earned
by the husband and wife was channeled through a joint checking
account, she should receive one-half of the assets purchased with
funds from that account. Implicitly finding the presumption to have
been rebutted, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held
that the trial court, as trier'of fact, was not compelled to find a
constructive trust for the wife's benefit in the property purchased
with funds from the joint account. "'
In Rutledge v. Rutledge,"' a case of first impression, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that the existence
of a final judgment gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that it
remains in full force and unsatisfied. The wife had sued the estate
of her deceased former husband for failure to construct and furnish
a house as had been provided in the final judgment. Counsel for the
estate argued that the Dead Man's Statute' rendered inadmissible
the wife's testimony as to failure of performance. The court stated
that the mere introduction of the final judgment into evidence
raised the presumption of nonpayment. Analogizing to Rule
1.110(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which characterizes
payment as an affirmative defense, the court reasoned that the
137. Bailey v. Bailey, 361 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
138, Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941).
139. Hagin v. Hagin, 353 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
140. 357 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
141. Id. at 207.
142. 357 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
143. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975) (repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237, § 2, as amended
by 1977 id. ch. 77-77, § 1 and 1978 id. ch. 78-361, § 22, effective as of 1978 id. ch. 78-379, §
1).
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burden of proof then shifted to the defendant. In the instant case,
the court held that the defendant failed to sustain this burden.'
F. Conveyances
The husband was required to satisfy a second mortgage encum-
bering the marital home, even though no consideration was given
for the note and mortgage and it was not executed according to law.
Affirming the lower court, the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, pointed out that since the chancellor did not have the mortga-
gee as a party she could not cancel the debt, but she could do equity
by making the husband solely responsible for it."
Where the wife had been granted exclusive possession of the
marital home while her mother lived there, it was held that on
resale, the wife should receive the benefit of the husband's increased
equity resulting from mortgage payments that the wife had made."'
In Gibson v. Sampson, 7 the wife had executed on her judgment
for alimony arrearages and purchased the house herself at a sheriff's
sale after advertising the notice of sale in an obscure weekly newspa-
per. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reinstated the
husband's complaint seeking to set aside the sheriff's sale, holding
that the husband's allegation that his wife had promised to notify
him personally raised the issue of a confidential relationship as
cotenants between the former husband and wife.
V. ArORNEY's FEES
In Dresser v. Dresser, "I The District Court of Appeal, First
District, receded from the harsh practice, approved in an earlier
decision,"' of denying an appellee's motion for attorney's fees for an
appeal where there was a failure to allege need or appellant's ability
to pay. Instead, when the trial court has awarded fee money to the
movant, the appellate court will assume that the parties' financial
needs are essentially the same as at the time of the final judgment,
provisionally grant the motion for allowance of fee money and re-
mand to the trial court the questions of the amount of a reasonable
fee and what part, if any, should be paid by the other party. 50
144. 357 So. 2d at 467-68.
145. Hechler v. Hechler, 351 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
146. Parry v. Parry, 353 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
147. 353 So. 2d 609, 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
148. 350 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
149. Burns v. Snedaker, 348 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
150. 350 So. 2d at 1154.
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The award of attorney's fees to a wife was reversed in Bucci v.
Bucci5 because the record reflected that the wife had approxi-
mately the same financial resources as her husband. The court said
that the wife had failed to establish that "the requesting party was
unable to pay the fee, and that the opposing party was able to
pay."'' 5 Similarly, where the record reflected that the wife had a
more favorable financial condition than the husband, an award to
the wife of $2,500 attorney's fees was reversed.""
Absent an agreement by the parties, attorney's fees may not be
decided on the basis of affidavits; the trial court must hold a hearing
to determine a reasonable fee as well as the wife's need and the
husband's ability to pay. 5' Furthermore, the amount of attorney's
fees cannot be ascertained without expert testimony directed to the
issue. "'55 Consequently, in Ruszala v. Ruszala,1'1 the trial court
abused its discretion in striking expert testimony presented on the
issue of reasonable attorney's fees, which had resulted in the wife
being arbitrarily penalized.
VI. ANTENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that an
antenuptial agreement providing that the husband would support
the wife for the duration of the marriage did not operate as a bar to
the seventy-seven year-old wife's claim for alimony from her eighty-
one year-old husband after fourteen years of marriage."' Since the
trial court had not allowed the presentation of any evidence relating
to alimony, the case was remanded for a full hearing on issues of
alimony and ownership of the parties' personal property.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has found error in
a trial court's refusal to admit into evidence an antenuptial contract
executed in Iran.' The lower court refused to consider the ante-
nuptial contract ostensibly because it was "entered into under the
laws of another country."'' The First District remanded with in-
151. 350 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
152. Id. at 790. See also Rosell v. Rosell, 362 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Canakaris v.
Canakaris, 356 So. 2d 858, 860-61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
153. Winston v. Winston, 362 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
154. Neale v. Neale, 359 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
155. Segal v. Segal, 353 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
156. 360 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
157. Seltsman v. Seltsman, 352 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
158. Mohammad v. Mohammad, 358 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
159. Id. at 611.
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
structions to consider the anteneuptial agreement in light of the
circumstances existing at the time of its execution and at the time
of the dissolution proceedings.
B. Postnuptial Agreements
An agreement between a seventy-two year old husband and his
thirty-four year old wife made six months before the husband filed
for dissolution was held void for duress and coercion, where the wife
had agreed to "release" to the husband $135,000 worth of bonds, and
the husband had agreed to transfer the title to the marital home
from his name to both names and to give his wife $115,000 worth of
bonds, 1,823 shares of various stocks, and cash. 60
VII. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
A. Jurisdiction
The strong public policy of Florida to provide for the well-being
of children within its borders was recently illustrated in Schrey v.
Schrey. " The wife, a Pennsylvania resident, had originally filed for
divorce in Pennsylvania while her husband was in Florida, but had
not requested custody in that action. Subsequently, the husband,
who along with the children was a Florida resident, filed in Florida
for divorce and custody. The wife moved for dismissal for lack of
personal and subject matter jurisdiction premised on the ground
that she had previously filed the Pennsylvania action. The lower
court granted the motion based on a finding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
reversed the trial court as to the custody action, stating: "Each state
is charged with the duty to regulate the custody of infants within
its borders.'
2
The Florida courts' subject matter jurisdiction has been legis-




In keeping with the statutory requirement that the court award
visitation rights "in accordance with the best interests of the
child,"'"' the appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial of the
160. Sniffen v. Sniffen, 352 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
161. 354 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
162. Id. at 406.
163. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-5, § 2 (codified at FiA. STAT. § 68.08 (Supp. 1978)).
164. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (Supp. 1978).
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husband's right to visit his adopted daughter, the natural child of
the wife, because the evidence showed that the child was afraid of
the husband.' A provision subjecting a husband's visitation rights
with the parties' minor child to the condition that no other person
be in his home while the child was present was stricken from the
final judgment as too restrictive.'"
The 1978 Florida Legislature has overruled prior case law"7 by
amending section 61.13(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes to provide that
under certain circumstances grandparents may be awarded visita-
tion rights for minor children, although they are not granted stand-
ing as full participants in dissolution proceedings.'
C. Modification
Appellate review of child castody decisions is extremely limited
"[b]ecause the custody issue primarily involves the evaluation of
human relationships, [and] the judgment of the trial court in re-
solving that issue must be afforded even greater respect than a
judgment involving issues which are capable of resolution based on
purely objective considerations.""' The appellate court will not
defer to the trial court, however, where a party has been denied an
opportunity to be heard. In Murphy v. Murphy, 170 the mother's peti-
tion for change of custody was granted after the father removed the
child from Broward County to Fort Walton Beach. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the lower court had no
authority to change custody unless there had been an emergency
involving the child's welfare because the father was not given a
165. Hechler v. Hechler, 351 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
166. Patrick v. Patrick, 358 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
167. Tamargo v. Tamargo, 348 So, 2d 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
168. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-5, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (Supp. 1978)). The
amended section reads as follows:
(b) The court shall award custody and visitation rights of minor children
of the parties as a part of proceeding for dissolution of marriage in accordance
with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act. Upon considering all relevant factors, the father of the
child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining custody.
The court may award the grandparents visitation rights of minor children if it is
deemed by the court to be in the child's best interest. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to require that grandparents, be made parties or given notice of
dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor shall such grandparents have legal
standing as "contentants" as defined in s. 61.1306, Florida Statutes. No court
shall order that a child be kept within the state or jurisdiction of the court solely
for the purpose of permitting visitation for the grandparents.
Id. (emphasis in original, indicating amended portion).
169. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 353 So. 2d 923, 924 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
170. 351 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
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chance to respond to the mother's petition. 7'
Similarly, the appellate court overturned a trial court order
transferring custody of the parties' thirteen year old son from his
mother to his father when the record failed to reflect substantial
competent evidence supporting the transfer.' The order was re-
versed because there had been no showing below of material and
substantial change of circumstances and because "the law favors
the reasonableness of the original decree" which had awarded cus-
tody to the mother.' Analogously, in Collins v. Newton,' where
both parties were found to be fit parents, it was reversible error to
change custody from the mother to the father when the only change
of circumstances was that the son was about to enter high school.
VIII. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Adult Children
A corollary of the general rule that the legal duty of a parent to
support his child ceases when the child reaches majority is the prin-
ciple that a parent, absent an agreement, cannot be required to
provide a college education for an adult child under the terms of a
child support decree.' Since children of a harmonious marriage
have no right to require their parents to provide them with a college
education, it would be inconsistent to argue that a divorced parent
has a greater obligation to his children. Furthermore, even if a duty
to support the adult child does exist, a dissolution proceeding is not
the proper forum; a separate suit must be brought to establish the
obligation. "' Consequently, it was held in Cyr v. Cyr'77 that in a
dissolution proceeding, a trial court did not have the authority to
require the father to pay child support after the children attained
the age of eighteen.
If it is claimed that an adult child is "dependent," and thus
entitled to support beyond the age of eighteen years, such a determi-
nation must be made at the time of the child's eighteenth birthday.
In Watterson v. Watterson, 78 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, reversed the trial court's finding that the husband's
171. Id. at 384.
172. Tash v. Oesterle, 356 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
173. Id. at 62.
174. 362 So. 2d 174, 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
175. Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
176. Id. at 485.
177. 354 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
178. 353 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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twenty-one year old son was a "dependent" person requiring sup-
port within the meaning of section 743.07(2) of the Florida Statutes
(1975). The court held that where the child was over twenty-one
years of age at the time of the final judgment and there was no
allegation of physical or mental disability, there was no justification
for requiring support for the child. The court reached this result
despite testimony from a clinical psychologist that the son was
"upset over his parents' divorce and was clinically depressed, so-
cially withdrawn and incapable of earning a living and maintaining
himself."' 79 The support payments ordered by the trial court were
reversed.
On different facts, however, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, found that the evidence adduced in an action for dissolu-
tion of marriage supported a finding of dependency beyond the
adult child's eighteenth birthday. 89 The parties' adopted son suf-
fered from debilitating muscular disorders and a severe personality
maladjustment. The court granted monetary support and awarded




A provision of a final judgment which provided for automatic
increases in child support at predetermined future dates was ap-
proved in Spotts v. Spotts.8 2 The court upheld the formula fash-
ioned by the trial court, noting that the automatic increases, which
corresponded to the husband's net income, were precise and defi-
nite. The court also noted that this formula would save time and
money by not requiring the parties to return to court every time the
husband's income increased. The husband's right to petition for
modification, however, was preserved.
18 3
Changed circumstances that will justify a reduction of child
support, according to the court in In re Marriage of Johnson, 84 must
be substantive, material, involuntary and permanent in nature. In
reversing the trial court's reduction of support, the District Court
of Appeal, First District, held that the husband's remarriage, volun-
tary job change and his lack of counsel at the hearing were insuffi-
cient circumstances to compel a support reduction. On the other
179. Id. at 1187.
180. George v. George, 360 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
181. Id. at 1110.
182. 355 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1978).
183. Id. at 229.
184. 352 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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hand, the First District approved the termination of a husband's
obligation to support his eighteen year old daughter because "she
does not acknowledge nor does she even visit" her father.' S5
Following the principles of review espoused by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Shaw v. Shaw,' the First District found that
the trial judge had abused his discretion by awarding a mere $100
per month increase in child support when the former husband had
been earning an additional $100,000 anually since the last modifica-
tion."' The case was remanded to the lower court with instructions
to grant a more adequate amount of support for the children.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed the trial
court's order awarding $25 per week child support on the basis of
lack of sufficient evidence in the record regarding both the hus-
band's ability to pay and the wife's lack of ability to contribute to
the support of the child despite the fact that the master had recom-
mended only the reservation of jurisdiction to award child sup-
port.' 8 The court pointed out that the award was less than what the
mother had been receiving under an agreement with her ex-husband
whereby they had agreed to share equally the child's expenses. The
lower court's order had effectively relieved the husband of any obli-
gation to pay more than $25 per week.
C. Remedies for Nonsupport
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed two con-
tempt orders, holding, in both instances, 81 that the trial judge had
failed to make the required finding that the husband had a present
ability to comply with the order to pay child support and willfully
refused to do so, or in the alternative, that the husband previously
had the ability to pay, "'but divested himself of that ability through
his fault or neglect designed to frustrate the intent and purpose of
the order.' "10
In Deter v. Deter,"'9 notwithstanding a finding that the ele-
ments of both civil"' and criminal"' contempt were present, a con-
185. Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 359 So. 2d 62, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
186. 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976).
187. Meltzer v. Meltzer, 356 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
188. .Yontz v. Yorkunas, 358 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
189. Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Hamra v. Hamra, 350 So. 2d
538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
190. Hamra v. Hamra, 350 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (quoting Faircloth v.
Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1976).
191. 353 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
192. Husband had failed to pay the wife. '
193. There was an alleged assault on the wife.
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tempt citation was reversed for failure to comply with the notice
requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840(a)(1).111
When the children have attained majority status, however, the
wife's remedy for recovery of child support arrearages is limited to
a judgment enforceable by ordinary civil proceedings.'95
D. Jurisdiction
In a case involving the domestication of a New York support
judgment, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held, inter
alia, in a dissolution proceeding where the wife has not been served
personally and does not appear, a Florida court cannot terminate
or modify a prior support order of a sister state."6 A judgment grant-
ing, denying or modifying child support is a "personal" judgment
that may be entered only if the court has in personam jurisdiction
over both parties."7
A trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
of a former wife's petition to enforce a judgment incorporating an
ex-husband's agreement to pay his son's college expenses was re-
versed and remanded. 98 While the father's liability was contingent
on his ability to pay, the lack of an allegation of such a fact in the
petition was not fatal to the court's jurisdiction to decide the issue.
E. Support for Religious Education
A trial court may require a husband to pay for his children's
religious education as part of child support payments when both
parties represented to the court that religious education was impor-
tant to their children's welfare.' The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, implied that if the children's need for attending
Sunday School and Hebrew School had been disputed, constitu-
tional questions would then have been raised.
2 0
IX. ADOIriON
If a child's natural parents are found to be unfit to care for him,
194. The defendant must be given adequate notice of the charges by sworn affidavit. The
court said that an allegation of "attacking and injuring petitioner" was not specific enough,
in the absence of any reference to time, place or date. 353 So. 2d at 618.
195. Moreland v. Moreland, 358 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (citing Wilkes v. Revels,
245 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), cert. denied, 247 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1971)).
196. Hunter v. Hunter, 359 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
197. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
198. Golden v. Golden, 356 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1978).
199. Schatz v. Schatz, 356 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
200. Id. at 894.
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it is the trial judge's difficult task to decide to whom custody should
be awarded. In Ex rel. W.H.,20° the grandmother, who had pre-
viously had temporary custody of the child, successfully sought a
reversal of the trial court's award of temporary custody to an unre-
lated couple who had taken care of the child for a substantial
amount of time. Although the evidence showed that the couple had
taken good care of the child, the court must award custody, if possi-
ble, to a close relative who is "fit, ready, able and willing to be
awarded custody. 2 02 Moreover, the forty-six year old grandmother
already had custody of the child's two brothers, and the court felt
that siblings should not be separated absent the most compelling of
reasons .20
When a natural parent is to be deprived of his child through
adoption, notice to him is a fundamental prerequisite. It has been
held to be error for the trial court to deny the natural father's motion
to vacate the final judgment of adoption where the evidence showed
that no effort had been made to effect either personal or construc-
tive service of process on him.20
Consent by a natural parent is usually a requirement before a
child can be adopted. A judicial determination of abandonment by
the parent, however, constitutes a deemed waiver of the consent
requirement.20 5 In Turner v. Adoption of Turner,00 the trial court
reluctantly refused to find legal abandonment by the child's natural
father, who was serving two consecutive life terms for murdering the
child's mother. The lower court relied on a prior decision which had
held that "the imprisonment of a natural parent under a lifetime
sentence does not, as a matter of law, constitute abandonment of
his natural child." ' 7 The District Court of Appeal, First District,
however, noted that the father had neither communicated with his
child nor requested to see her since his imprisonment. The court
held, therefore, that under these facts abandonment had occurred.20 s
In a subsequent abandonment case decided by the First Dis-
trict, an incarcerated natural father, after receiving notice, failed to
appear at the adoption proceeding in person or through counsel. The
court affirmed the denial of the natural father's motion to set aside
201. 356 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
202. Id. at 34.
203. Id.
204. Canaday v. Gresham, 362 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
205. FLA. STAT. § 63.072 (1977).
206. 352 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
207. Harden v. Thomas, 329 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
208. 352 So. 2d at 960.
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the final judgment of adoption on the ground of excusable neglect.'"
A strong dissent argued that the natural father's ignorance of the
legal requirement that he must set for hearing or file a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum coupled with his request
to present evidence at the adoption hearing provided ample basis
for the type of excusable neglect contemplated by Rule 1.540(b) of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
210
Under certain circumstances, the consent of the natural parent
is not needed before the child can be adopted. According to In re
Adoption of Mullenix,21I a putative father of a child born to an
unwed mother was not within any category of section 63.062 of the
Florida Statutes (1975)12 which would have required his consent to
the adoption. Furthermore, the court found that the father's argu-
ment of denial of equal protection was without merit in that his
"interests are readily distinguishable from those of a divorced fa-
ther, and . . .the State could permissively give [the putative fa-
ther] less veto authority than it provides to a married father.
213
A natural mother had petitioned the lower court to regain cus-
tody of her two minor children who had been permanently commit-
ted to the care of the state. The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, construed section 39.11(6) of the Florida Statutes (1977) to
prevent her from reopening the original commitment proceeding to
regain custody.21' The court pointed out, however, that she could
petition the circuit court, through an independent adoption pro-
ceeding, to adopt her children.
209. Despres v. Pagel, 358 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
210. Id. at 906-07 (Ervin, J. dissenting).
211. 359 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
212. As a condition precedent to adoption, the statute requires the consent of the father
of minor child if:
1. The minor was conceived or born while the father was married to the
mother.
2. The minor is his child by adoption.
3. The minor has been established by court proceeding to be~his child.
4. He has acknowledged in writing, signed in the presence of a competent
witness, that he is the father of the minor and has filed such acknowledgment with
the vital statistics office of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
5. He has provided the child with support in a repetitive, customary man-
ner.
FLA. STAT. § 63.062(1)(b) (1977).
213. 359 So. 2d at 65.
214. Thompson v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 353 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1977).
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X. LEGISLATION RELATING TO JUVENILES
The Supreme Court of Florida held unconstitutional a statute
which prohibited billiard parlors from permitting persons under the
age of twenty-one to play billiards while exempting bowling alleys
with pool tables from the statute.2t6 The court found that section
849.06 of the Florida Statutes (1975) violated equal protection, be-
cause there was no practical difference between playing billiards in
a billiard parlor and playing billiards in a bowling alley sufficient
to warrant a special classification for billiard parlor operators.
Reversing two lower courts, the supreme court upheld the con-
stitutionality of section 827.04(2) of the Florida Statutes (1975),
which deals with negligent treatment of children. 16 The court held
that the statute was not vague, indefinite and overbroad. The court
distinguished its decision in an earlier case which had struck down
a statute criminalizing negligent treatment of children," 7 pointing
out that section 827.04(2) requires scienter or culpable negligence.'"
XI. SCOPE OF REVIEW
It is very difficult to predict how appellate courts will treat
property distributions because the trial judge's determination of
matters involviig monetary and property allocation is influenced by
many factors which are accorded unequal weight. In Florida, there
is a striking contrast between the broader scope of review employed
by the District Court of Appeal, First District, and the narrower
reevaluation of evidence made by the District Court of Appeal,
Third District.
A. District Court of Appeal, First District
The District Court of Appeal, First District, merely stating that
there was no substantial competent evidence in the record, reversed
an award of seventy-five dollars per week permanent, periodic
alimony to the wife."' A similar result was reached in Canakaris v.
215. Rollins v. State, 354 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1978).
216. State v. Joyce, 361 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978).
217. State v. Winters, 346 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1977).
218. Section 827.04(2) provides:
(2) Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or
allows a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical
treatment, or who, knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits the physical or
mental health of the child to be materially endangered, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084.
FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1975).
219. Bateman v. Bateman, 358 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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Canakaris.220 The wife had been awarded assets worth over $330,000
after twenty-five years of marriage to a physician whose net worth
was well over $3 million. Despite the fact that she had abandoned
her career to marry her husband and scrubbed floors to further
his career, that the husband had engaged in adulterous relation-
ships, 2' and that they had an apparent high standard of living, the
court held that there was no competent substantial evidence to
support an award of $500 per week permanent periodic alimony.
B. District Court of Appeal, Third District
Generally, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, has
strictly followed the complementary tests of appellate review es-
poused by the Supreme Court of Florida in Shaw v. Shaw2 22 and
Herzog v. Herzog."2 3 These cases hold that an appellate court may
not reevaluate the evidence 22' and that, absent a lack of substantial
evidence in the record, the findings of the trial court should be
affirmed. 225 For example, in Bucci v. Bucci,25 the court refused to
reverse an award of $750 per month as alimony to the wife in spite
of their acknowledgment that the income as given in the parties'
federal tax returns would not justify an award of that amount. The
district court upheld the lower court because there 'was evidence in
the record from which the lower court could infer that the husband
had other resources. The court, however, did not state the amount
of these other resources or if the trial judge had any idea of the
extent of the alleged resources.12
The Third District took its narrowest approach to judicial re-
view in Burch v. Burch.22 1 The court refused to reverse the trial
court's award of forty dollars per week rehabilitative alimony where
the husband earned in excess of $26,000 per year, stating that:
While we might be of the view that the award of rehabilita-
tive alimony was not proper here and that, if proper, the amount
awarded was insufficient, we cannot say that the judgment is not
supported by "competent evidence" which is the test laid down
220. 356 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
221. Id. at 861 (McCord, C.J., dissenting).
222. 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976).
223. 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1977).
224. Shaw, 334 So. 2d at 16.
225. Herzog, 346 So. 2d at 58.
226. 350 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
227. Id. at 788-89.
228. 352 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
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by the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
to overturn the trial court at the appellate level."'
Several cases, though, have indicated a slight departure from
the strict adherence to the Shaw and Herzog standards. In Meltzer
v. Meltzer, u the court rejected as too meager an increase of $100 in
child support where the ex-husband's income had tripled since the
last modification. Despite claims of adherence to the strictures of
Shaw,"' the court peppered its opinion with expressions such as
"[tihe appellant argues persuasively," "[w]e are convinced," and
"[iut is our view. ' 232 Similarly, in a seemingly inequitable decision,
the Third District reversed an award of $165 per month permanent
alimony to the sixty year old wife because the record did not contain
competent evidence that substantiated the wife's needs.m The
lower court, however, had found that the wife was in a state of poor
health and that her expenses exceeded her income by approximately
$400. In a third case, the Third District modified an award of $300
per month permanent alimony to a thirty-two year old wife of an
orthodontist who had been married eleven years.234 The award was
changed to $300 per month rehabilitative alimony for three years.
The dissent to the court's denial of rehearing argued that the major-
ity had substituted its judgment for that of the trial court and that




The no-fault concept in dissolution of marriage has not dimin-
ished the volume of family law litigation; it has merely redefined its
focus. The courts, however, having developed the legal standards,
are now struggling to define their factual parameters. Consequently,
for the foreseeable future, domestic relations case law will continue
to revolve around the factual setting.
229. Id. at 553.
230. 356 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
231. Id. at 1265 n.2.
232. Id. at 1265.
233. George v. George, 360 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
234. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 352 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (per curiam).
235. Id. at 868 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
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